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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950246-CA 
v. 
BRIAN MAGUIRE 
Defendant/Appellant 
Priority No. 3 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Brian Maguire appeals the trial court's denial of 
his motion to correct sentence (R. 765). The trial court imposed 
the sentence on defendant's plea to aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995) (R. 
632) . This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1995) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did defendant preserve the double jeopardy claim he 
raises on appeal; alternatively, did the trial court commit plain 
error by not recognizing and reaching appellate claim sua sponte? 
Defendant's failure to preserve the issue permits appellate 
review for plain error only. See, e.g., State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393, 404-405 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 
(1995). Defendant's failure to argue plain error on appeal 
precludes reaching the merits of defendant's claim. State v. 
Seoulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 1992). 
2. Alternatively, did defendant have a legitimate 
expectation of finality in the sentence imposed on his first plea 
even though he challenged the plea on appeal? This claim 
requires a ruling on the applicability of the federal double 
jeopardy clause; therefore, it raises an issue of constitutional 
interpretation reviewed for correctness. State v. Davis, 903 
P.2d 940, 943 (Utah App. 1995), reversed on other grounds, slip 
op. 960005 (Utah 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of U.S. Const, amend. V. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By amended information dated January 2, 1988, the State 
charged defendant with aggravated assault, a third degree felony, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995); mayhem, a second 
degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105 (1995); and 
being an habitual criminal, a first degree felony, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990) (R. 31-33). 
On April 21, 1988, defendant pleaded no contest to 
aggravated assault, and the trial court granted the State's 
motion to dismiss the other two counts (R. 111-113). On April 
22, 1988, the trial court lowered the third-degree felony 
aggravated assault to a class A misdemeanor and sentenced 
defendant to not more than one year in prison to run concurrently 
with any other sentences (R. 114). 
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Defendant moved to withdraw his plea on August 10, 1988 (R. 
124). The trial court denied his motion (R. 260). This Court 
reversed in an unpublished opinion, and the supreme court 
affirmed this Court's disposition. State v. Maquire, 830 P.2d 
216, 217-18 (Utah 1991). 
On remand, defendant again pleaded guilty to aggravated 
assault, and the State again moved to dismiss the mayhem and 
habitual criminal charges (R. 571, 625-26, 866-68). On this 
plea, the trial court imposed the statutorily prescribed zero-to-
five-year prison sentence and ordered it to run consecutively 
with any other sentences defendant was then serving (R. 632, 881-
87). The trial court also gave defendant credit for the time he 
served on his previous no contest plea (R. 632, 880). 
Defendant filed a motion to correct the sentence, contending 
that the trial court illegally imposed the zero-to-five-year 
consecutive sentence because it was more severe than the sentence 
imposed on his original no-contest plea (R. 636-54, 739-45). The 
trial court denied the motion in a signed minute entry dated 
March 17, 1995 (R. 765). Defendant timely filed his notice of 
appeal (R. 774). 
This Court reversed the trial court. State v. Maquire, 924 
P.2d 904 (Utah App. 1996). The Supreme Court reversed this Court 
and remanded the case for consideration of defendant's double 
jeopardy claim. State v. Maquire, 957 P.2d 598, 600 (Utah 1998). 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Defendant's first plea. 
While on parole from a prior murder conviction, defendant 
tore off the top third of his grandmother's ear (R. 29, 111, 408, 
443, 447-50, 626). The State charged defendant with aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony; mayhem, a second degree felony; 
and being an habitual criminal, a first degree felony (R. 31-33). 
A parole supervisor filed an information on defendant's parole 
violation, citing the mayhem and aggravated assault charges as 
two of four bases for revoking defendant's parole on his prior 
murder conviction (R. 133, 654, 663, 670, 700) . 
Defendant ultimately pleaded no contest to the third degree 
felony aggravated assault charge in exchange for the State's 
agreement to dismiss the mayhem and habitual criminal charges, to 
recommend reducing the third degree felony aggravated assault to 
a class A misdemeanor, and to permit him to withdraw the plea if 
the trial court refused the reduced sentence recommendation (R. 
111-12; Tr. April 21, 1988 at 2, 5-6, 8-9). The trial court 
granted the motion to reduce the sentence, sentenced defendant to 
a prison term not to exceed one year, and ordered the prison 
sentence to run concurrently with any other sentence (R. 114; Tr. 
April 21, 1988 at 14-15) . 
In reliance on his no-contest plea to aggravated assault, 
the Board of Pardons revoked defendant's parole on his prior 
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murder conviction (R. 133, 655, 670, 673) . 
Defendant succeeded on his subsequent appellate challenge to 
his no-contest plea. State v. Maquire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992). 
While that appeal was pending, defendant completed the one-year 
sentence that resulted from that plea. However, he remained 
incarcerated on the revocation of his parole on his prior murder 
conviction (R. 877). 
B. Defendant's second plea. 
The case was remanded to the trial court, the State 
reinstated the charges, and defendant went to trial. Part way 
through trial, defendant initiated new plea negotiations (R. 
863). Pursuant to the resulting plea agreement, defendant 
pleaded guilty to the same third degree felony aggravated 
assault, and the State again moved to dismiss the mayhem and 
habitual criminal charges (R. 571, 625-26, 866-68). This time, 
however, defendant did not move for and the State did not agree 
to recommend reducing the sentence to a class A misdemeanor 
(id.). Consequently, the trial court sentenced defendant to a 
zero-to-five-year prison term without any objection from 
defendant (R. 632, 881-87). Over defendant's objection, the 
trial court also ordered the sentence to run consecutively with 
defendant's sentence on his murder conviction (id.). The 
sentencing court gave defendant credit for the one year he served 
on the prior, class A misdemeanor conviction (R. 632, 880) . 
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Defendant did not contend that double jeopardy prohibited 
resentencing him because he had completed the one-year sentence 
imposed on the first plea. 
C. Defendant's current motion to correct sentence. 
Over two years later, defendant filed a motion to correct 
the sentence (R. 636-54, 379-45). In his motion, defendant 
contended that both Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1995) and the 
federal proscription against double jeopardy prohibited imposing 
a harsher sentence (R. 636-38). Again, defendant did not contend 
that double jeopardy prohibited resentencing him because he had 
completed the original sentence (id.). 
The trial court denied the motion and defendant appealed (R. 
765, 774). On appeal to this Court, defendant contended that: 1) 
his trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to challenge 
the legality of his sentence; 2) section 76-3-405 prohibited the 
harsher sentence; 3) double jeopardy prohibited imposing a 
sentence on his aggravated assault plea that ran consecutively to 
his prison term on the murder conviction because both sentences 
arose from the same set of facts; and 4) double jeopardy and due 
process prohibited resentencing him on the second aggravated 
assault plea because he had completed the sentence imposed on the 
first plea. Appellant's Supplemental Brief in Maguire I at 14-
39. 
In responding to defendant's fourth argument, the only one 
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at issue on this remand, the State contended that defendant had 
not preserved the argument and had failed to brief it adequately. 
Appellee's Brief in Maguire I at 20-21. This Court addressed 
only the second and third of defendant's appellate claims. State 
v. Maguire, 924 P.2d 904, 905 (Utah App. 1996). The Court held 
that double jeopardy did not prohibit both revoking defendant's 
parole and punishing him criminally for the aggravated assault on 
his grandmother. Id. at 905-906. However, the Court reversed 
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to correct 
defendant's sentence, holding that § 76-3-405 prohibited the 
harsher sentence. Id. at 906-907. 
The Utah Supreme Court granted the State's petition for writ 
of certiorari. State v. Maguire, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). In 
his merits brief, defendant again contended that double jeopardy 
prohibited the second, harsher sentence because he had completed 
the first. Respondent's Brief at 44-48. 
The supreme court reversed this Court's holding that section 
76-3-405 prohibited the harsher sentence. State v. Maguire, 957 
P.2d 598, 599-600 (Utah 1998). However, the supreme court 
concluded that the double jeopardy claim was not properly before 
it and remanded the case to this Court for consideration of that 
claim. State v. Maguire, 957 P.2d at 600. 
The argument sections below contain additional relevant 
facts. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Preservation of claim. Defendant never presented the 
trial court with his appellate claim that double jeopardy 
prohibited resentencing him because he had completed the first 
sentence. Therefore, defendant has not preserved this issue for 
appeal. 
Similarly, defendant has not established that the trial 
court plainly erred by not reaching this conclusion sua sponte. 
Indeed, no controlling precedent mandates the result defendant 
seeks. Therefore, defendant cannot establish plain error. 
2. Double jeopardy. Alternatively, defendant's claim fails 
on its merits. First, defendant contends that resentencing him 
after he had completed the first sentence on the withdrawn plea 
imposed multiple punishments for the same crime. However, the 
"multiple punishments" proscription only prohibits imposing more 
punishment than the legislature allows and, on resentencing to a 
harsher sentence, requires only that defendant receive credit for 
time served on the first sentence. The trial court gave 
defendant credit for the one year he served on the class A 
misdemeanor and imposed only the statutory sentence for the third 
degree felony. Therefore, the trial court did not impose a 
second punishment for the same crime. 
Second, double jeopardy would preclude resentencing 
defendant only if he had a legitimate expectation of finality in 
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the completed first sentence. However, because defendant 
continued to challenge the plea underlying the first sentence, he 
had no legitimate expectation of finality in it. Therefore, the 
trial court could resentence defendant without violating double 
jeopardy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT ARGUED IN THE TRIAL COURT ONLY THAT 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY ALWAYS PROHIBITS IMPOSING A HARSHER 
SENTENCE AFTER A SUCCESSFUL APPEAL, HE FAILED TO 
PRESERVE HIS SPECIFIC CLAIM THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
PROHIBITED RESENTENCING HIM BECAUSE HE COMPLETED THE 
FIRST SENTENCE WHILE HIS APPEAL WAS PENDING 
On this remand, defendant once again contends that, because 
he completed the class A misdemeanor sentence imposed on his 
original no-contest plea, double jeopardy prohibited imposing the 
statutory zero-to-five year prison term on his second guilty plea 
to the same offense. Appellant's Brief at 9-17. Defendant has 
not preserved this claim or argued any basis for considering its 
merits despite his procedural default. Therefore, the Court need 
not consider this claim on its merits. 
In the trial court, defendant argued only that double 
jeopardy always prohibits imposing the harsher sentence after his 
successful appeal (R. 638). Although defendant mentioned that he 
had already completed the first sentence, he did not rely on 
completing the first sentence to support his double jeopardy 
argument. 
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Defendant did not argue that his completion of the first 
sentence raised the double jeopardy bar until he filed his first 
brief in this Court. Appellant's Brief in Maguire I at 36.l 
Defendant's failure to present this argument to the trial court 
deprived that court of the first opportunity to dispose of the 
claim and, consequently, failed to preserve the claim for appeal. 
See, e.g., State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30, 33 (Utah App. 
1996) (where defendant objected only on Fifth Amendment grounds 
to the victim witness remaining in the courtroom, he could not 
add Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims on appeal); State v. 
Range1, 866 P.2d 607, 611-12 (Utah App. 1993) (references to an 
evidentiary rule and general references to due process concerns 
were insufficient to preserve a facial constitutional challenge 
to the rule). 
Defendant could nevertheless prevail on this argument if he 
could establish that the trial court plainly erred by not finding 
that double jeopardy prohibited resentencing him because he had 
completed the first sentence. See, e.g., State v. Sepulveda, 842 
P.2d 913, 917 (Utah App. 1992). However, defendant does not 
argue that the trial court plainly erred, instead treating the 
issue as though he preserved it. His failure to argue plain 
:However, even in that brief, defendant provided no case 
authority or analysis to support his contention. Instead, 
defendant waited until he filed his brief in the supreme court to 
provide any analysis and case authority. Respondent's Brief at 
44-48. 
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error bars considering the merits of his claim. Id. at 917-18. 
Alternatively, defendant cannot establish plain error in 
this case. Controlling precedent required the trial court to 
reject the only argument defendant made to it: that double 
jeopardy always precludes imposing a harsher sentence after a 
successful appeal. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720-
22 (1969) (double jeopardy poses no bar to imposing a harsher 
sentence after a successful challenge to a conviction). 
Moreover, nothing in the controlling precedent should have 
alerted the trial court that it should reach and resolve sua 
sponte the issue defendant raises here: that completion of the 
first sentence raised a double jeopardy bar to resentencing him. 
To the contrary, the controlling precedent would have led the 
trial court to believe that defendant's challenge to the first 
guilty plea vitiated any double jeopardy claim. In United States 
v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980), the Supreme Court held 
that the government's right to appeal destroyed DiFrancesco's 
expectation of finality in his first sentence; therefore, double 
jeopardy did not prohibit resentencing him to a harsher sentence. 
In Pearce, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's success on 
appeal "wipes the slate clean," and double jeopardy poses no 
proscription to increasing the sentence on retrial. North 
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 720-22. 
Neither case included any provision that completing the 
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sentence while the appeal was pending would require a different 
result. To the contrary, in Pearce, two concurring opinions 
suggested that the blanket rule would not apply if the defendant 
had fully served the original sentence; however, the majority 
made no exception to its broad rule for that eventuality. Id. at 
720-22, 750 n.7 (Harlan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in 
part), 732-33 (Douglas J., concurring). From this, the trial 
court could have inferred that the United States Supreme Court 
rejected making a distinction based on whether a defendant had 
completed the original sentence. 
Moreover, defendant cites no controlling cases that clearly 
required the trial court to come to the contrary conclusion, and 
the State found none. As discussed in the following point, the 
few cases that the State found that have addressed the issue 
directly hold that completion of the sentence while the appeal is 
pending does not create a double jeopardy bar to resentencing. 
Therefore, defendant cannot establish that the trial court 
plainly erred by not holding sua sponte that the sentencing court 
violated his double jeopardy rights by resentencing him to a 
harsher sentence after he had completed the first while his 
appeal was pending. See State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 36 
(Utah) (error in failing to make written findings required by 
case law not obvious where the appellate decision establishing 
the requirement had not yet been decided), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
12 
814 (1989). 
POINT II 
ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FAILS ON ITS MERITS 
BECAUSE HE CANNOT SIMULTANEOUSLY CHALLENGE THE PLEA ON 
WHICH THE FIRST SENTENCE WAS BASED AND CLAIM A 
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF FINALITY IN THAT SENTENCE 
Defendant contends that imposing the harsher sentence after 
his second plea even though he had completed the sentence after 
the first plea violated the double jeopardy proscription against 
punishing him twice for the same offense. Appellant's Brief at 
9-15. Defendant applies the wrong double jeopardy analysis to 
this claim: resentencing does not punish him twice for the same 
crime. 
Instead, the appropriate double jeopardy inquiry is whether 
defendant acquired a legitimate expectation of finality in the 
first sentence; if he did, double jeopardy prohibited 
resentencing him. However, because defendant continued to 
challenge the plea underlying the first sentence even after he 
fully served the sentence, he had no legitimate expectation of 
finality in that sentence. 
A. Resentencing defendant after his second plea does not 
punish him twice for the same offense. 
The State does not dispute defendant's general proposition 
that double jeopardy prohibits punishing him twice for the same 
offense. However, that proscription ensures only that the total 
punishment imposed does not exceed that permitted by the 
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legislature. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 276, 381 (1989). In the 
context of resentencing a criminal defencant after a successful 
challenge to the first conviction or sentence, the proscription 
against imposing multiple punishments for the same crime requires 
only that defendant receive credit for the time he served on the 
first sentence. Id. at 381-82; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 
U.S. 711, 717-19 (1969). 
On defendant's second plea, the trial court imposed the 
statutorily-prescribed penalty and gave aefendant credit for the 
time that he served on his first sentence against his second (R. 
632, 880). The proscription against imposing multiple 
punishments required no more. Id. 
B. Defendant had no expectation of finality in the first 
sentence as long as he continued to challenge the 
underlying guilty plea. 
The appropriate inquiry in determining whether double 
jeopardy precluded resentencing defendant is whether defendant 
acquired a legitimate expectation of finality in the original 
sentence. See, e.g., Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. at 396. This 
analysis evolved from the Supreme Court's decision in United 
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980). 
The criminal statute at issue in DiFrancesco gave the 
government a limited right to appeal a sentence. Id. at 119-20. 
DiFrancesco argued that double jeopardy prohibited giving the 
government a right to appeal his sentence. The Supreme Court 
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rejected that argument, holding that "a sentence does not have 
the qualitites of constitutional finality that attend an 
acquittal." Id. at 135. The Supreme Court further supported its 
holding by noting that DiFrancesco had no legitimate expectation 
of finality in the first sentence because he was charged with 
knowledge that the statute gave the government the right to 
appeal the sentence. Id. at 136. That language has become the 
controlling analysis: double jeopardy prohibits increasing an 
already-imposed sentence only after a defendant acquires a 
legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence. See, e.g.. 
Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. at 396; Pasguarille v. United States, 
130 F.3d 1220, 1222-23 (6~ Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Rodriguez, 114 F.3d 46, 48 (5^ Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Daddino, 5 F.3d 262, 265 (7" Cir. 1993); United States v. Foael, 
829 F.2d 77, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. Andersson, 813 
F.2d 1450, 1461 (9^ Cir. 1987); Woodhouse v. United States, 934 
F. Supp. 1008, 1014 (C. D. 111. 1996), affirmed, 109 F.3d 347 
(7"' Cir.), cert, denied, 118 S. Ct. 143 (1997). 
Defendant contends that double jeopardy barred resentencing 
him because he had completed the first sentence while his appeal 
on the underlying plea was pending. Consequently, the double 
jeopardy issue this case presents is whether defendant obtained 
an expectation of finality in his sentence upon its completion 
even though he continued to prosecute the appeal challenging the 
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underlying plea. 
No United States Supreme Court case or prior case from the 
Utah courts addresses this precise issue. However, decisions 
from other jurisdictions that have dealt with the issue directly 
have rejected the argument defendant makes. For example, in 
Pasauarille v. United States, 130 F.3d 1220 (6-h cir. 1997), the 
sixth circuit rejected Pasquarille's contention that he had a 
legitimate expectation of finality in a completed sentence on an 
unchallenged conviction because he challenged an interrelated 
conviction. In that case, the district court originally imposed 
a thirty-seven month prison term on a drug charge and a 
consecutive sixty month term on a related firearms charge. Id. 
at 1221. Pasquarille moved to vacate the firearms conviction 
only. Id. While the motion was pending, defendant completed the 
sentence on the drug conviction. Id. at 1221-22. The district 
court granted Pasquarille's motion and vacated the firearms 
conviction. Id. at 1221. It then proceeded to increase the 
already-completed sentence on the drug conviction. Id. 
On appeal, Pasquarille contended, as defendant contends, 
that double jeopardy prohibited the increase because he had 
already completed the sentence on the drug conviction. Id. at 
1222-23. The sixth circuit rejected that contention. The court 
held that Pasquarille's challenge to the related firearms 
conviction destroyed any expectation of finality Pasquarille 
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might have had in the completed drug conviction sentence. Id. 
See also Woodhouse v. United States, 934 F. Supp. at 1014 (C. D. 
111. 1996). 
If a challenge to a conviction can defeat an expectation of 
finality in a completed sentence on a separate, related, and 
unchallenged conviction, then an appeal of the plea should 
clearly destroy any expectation of finality in the sentence on 
that plea. Therefore, defendant's continued challenge to his 
first plea destroyed any expectation of finality in the resulting 
sentence even though defendant completed the sentence while the 
appeal was pending. 
Defendant cites no case that requires the contrary result, 
and the State found none.2 Instead, defendant relies primarily 
:The State recognizes that dicta exists that suggests that 
completing the sentence may create an expectation of finality. 
For example, in United States v. Daddino, 5 F.3d 262 (7-'" Cir. 
1993), cited by defendant, the seventh circuit stated the Daddino 
acquired an expectation of finality in the portion of the 
sentence that he had completed. Id. at 265. However, the court 
also noted that, at the time the trial court amended Daddino's 
sentence, the time for either Daddino or the government to appeal 
had passed. Because neither Daddino nor the government appealed 
that conviction, Daddino acquired a legitimate expectation of 
finality in the sentence. 
Moreover, in a later case, the seventh circuit affirmed a 
district court's holding that the defendant's appeal of a related 
sentence defeated the defendant's expectation of finality in a 
completed sentence. United States v. Woodhouse, 109 F.3d 347, 
348 (1^ Cir.), cert, denied, 118 S. Ct. 143 (1997). Therefore, 
the seventh circuit has now disavowed the dictum in Daddino on 
which defendant relies. At most, Daddino stands for the 
proposition that a defendant acquires an expectation of finality 
in a sentence arising out of a conviction that neither the 
defendant nor the government timely challenges. The State does 
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on the nineteenth century Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte 
Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873). However, the Supreme Court limited 
Lange to stand only for the proposition that a defendant may 
receive no greater sentence than the legislature prescribed. 
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 140. See also United 
States v. Jones, 722 F.2d at 637; United State v. Bishop, 774 
F.2d at 775. The trial court did not violate the Lange 
proscription: the statute specifically authorized the zero-to-
five-year sentence (R. 632, 881-87). Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-103 
(1995) and 76-3-203(3) (1995). 
In sum, defendant's appellate challenge to the first plea 
prevented him from acquiring any expectation of finality in the 
resulting class A misdemeanor sentence. His completion of that 
sentence prior to the resolution of his appeal does not change 
that result. Double jeopardy required only that he receive 
credit for the time served on the first sentence against the 
second. Because the trial court gave him that, defendant has 
received all that the Constitution guaranteed him. 
not dispute that proposition. 
Similarly, in United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450 (9"-~ 
Cir. 1987), the ninth circuit held that Andersson had no 
expectation of finality because he challenged his sentence on 
appeal and had not completed the sentence. Id. at 1461. 
Although the language suggests that completion may give rise to 
an expectation of finality despite the appeal, Andersson had not 
completed the sentence; therefore, the ninth circuit did not have 
definitively resolve that issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, defendant's defendant's 
sentence should be affirmed. 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM A 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
